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MICHIGAN LAW JOURNAL.
CONTRA CTS OF SALE OF MERCIIANDISE.
FRA UD ON TlE VENDOR.
HON. LEVI T. GRIFFIN.
CHARACTER OF STATEMENTS MADE.
REPRESENTA TIONS TO COMMERCIAL AGENCIES.
In a former article (May number JOURNAL) fraud in contem-
plation of law, or legal fraud was considered. It was contended
that a false representation, though honestly made and believed to be
true, afforded sufficient ground to the vendor for rescinding a con-
tract of sale. We now propose to briefly consider character of state-
ments made, with some reference also to representations made to
conmeruial agencies. It may be regarded as within the common
knowledge of the profession, that the false representation must be
the assertion of a fact, and usually of an existing fact, although the
fact may depend upon some practical test assumed to have been
made. This question oftener arises, in cases of alleged fraud on the
purchaser, arid though we are treating of fraud on the vendor, we
may refer to such cases as illustrating the subject. The fullest in-
quiry is permissible. Thus, where on a sale of milk cans, the de-
fendant attempted to recoup damages by reason of the false repre-
sentation of plaintiff, that the plaintiff had title to certain territory,
in which to use the cans, evidence was admitted, that the plaintiff's
agent represented that as soon as the defendant's creamery was
completed, another creamery company then operating in the terri-
tory, would have to leave it. So also in the same case it is held
that the agent's representation, which he knew to be false, that 600
cans would operate the creamery, was a good ground for damages, if
damages resulted. Davis v. Davis, 97 Mich. 419.
It is obvious that the assertion, in reference to the 600 cans is
considered as based upon the assumed knowledge of the agent ob-
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tained by a practical trial, and therefor a representation of fact, and
not a mere expression of opinion; for without a trial it could
hardly be determined what number of cans would operate the
creamery. There is a test that is always helpful, if not decisive, in
determining how far a statement should be regarded as an assertion
of fact of an actionable character, if false. Every person may be
said to repose at his peril in the opinion of others, when he has an
equal opportunity to form and exercise his own judgment. When
the vendor has no superior knowledge, and the parties stand upon
equal terms and the facts lie open to both parties, with equal oppor-
tunities and observation and examination, and the vendor honestly
expresses his opinion, though it turn out to be incorrect, the buyer
is not relieved from the application of the principle of caocat eIptor.
Thus on a sale of stock of goods the vendor's statement does not
generally stand on the same footing as facts, even as to amount,
quality, or value, when the purchaser sees or knows the property,
or has opportunities to know it. Collins v. Jaclkson, 54 Mich. 186.
Joh)ison v. Seymour, 79 Mich. 156. See also Fa'rar v. Chiurchill, 13.5
U. S. 609. Farnswor tl v. Dit.jfncr, 142 U. S. 43. Southerit Dcre'lop-
",mcit Company v. Sil-via, 125 U. S. 247.
It may be observed that, unless under exceptional circum-
stances, statements of value, though incorrect, are not such asser-
tions of fact as to constitute fraud. Yet it cannot be laid down as a
rule of law that value is never a material fact. When it is known
that the purchaser relies upon the superior knowledge of the seller,
as to quality or value, the seller is bound to act honorably and deal
fairly with the purchaser; when confidence is reposed in him he is
bound not to abuse it ; thus when a jeweler, knowing the purchaser's
ignorance, designably defrauds him by false statements of the value
of articles in his trade, which none but an expert could reasonably
be expected to understand; so also representation of value made by
the vendor of mining stock to one who knows nothing about the
value of mining property, and relies on such representation ; so also
in the case of a purchaser of a mortgage on distant lands who relies
on and is misled by representations made to him by the seller, as to
the mortgagor's responsibility, and value of the security, even
though honestly made and even though the seller had suggested to
the purchaser that he look at the lands for himself, and had offered
to pay the traveling expenses of the purchaser, if the lands did not
suit, as their judgment might not agree. It is said that such a
suggestion implies the assertion, that the seller has exercised an
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intelligent judgment, and really increases the purchaser's sense of
security therein. Webster v. Bailey, 36 Mich. 36; Maxted v. Fowler, 94
Mich. 106; Picard v. McCormick, 11 Mich. 68.
The representation must also be material. This is not made to
depend upon any notion of materiality the vendor may 'have in his
mind. Though the representation appears to the vendor to be
material, it is not to be decided by him. If the materiality is dis-.
puted it is a question like many others, for the jury, and they must
determine under the evidence and instructions of the court, whether
the fact represented is or was really material, and it would be error
to instruct the jury to find whether they were deemed by the party to
be material. Davis v. Davis supra.
The representation itself need not be the sole inducement for
entering into the contract. Various matters may exert an influence;
but if the false representation operates as one cause of the §ale, it is
fraudulent, although the sale may have been mainly prompted by
reliance placed on other matters. Kirkendal v. Hartsock, 58 llfe.
App. 234.
It is hardly necessary to suggest that the vendor must rely in
whole or in part, upon the false representation made, and some
damage by reason thereof mnst accrue to him. And still further, it
is essential that the means used should be sticcessfua in deceiving
however false and dishonest the artifices, they do not constitute
fraud, if the other party sees through them.
Thus far we have assumed that the representation is made to
the vendor, but the existence of large commercial agencies cannot be
ignored. They exist and are organized to collect information, as to
the standing and pecuniary responsibility of merchants and dealers
throughout the country. Their subscribers when applied to by
customers to purchase goods on credit, invariably resort to the
agency or to published lists, before yielding a favorable answer to
the application. They are thus especially -helpful to the jobber, to
enable him to know when and to whom to give credit. They are
supposed to have facilities at their command, to enable them to
become familiar with the financial standing of the business class,
and business men desiring credit make statements and representa-
tions, which are intended and calculated to secure it. It is usually
true that upon the faith of such statements credit is not then asked
of any particular person, but it is yet intended and understood, that
such statements siall afford a basis of credit. These statements are
now regarded in the law as in effect made to the person or persons
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who rely upon them and give credit. Genesse Banl v.. Michigan
Barge Co. 52 Mich. 164.
There is however much to determine in connection with this
question. The courts usually go no further than is necessary, to
decide the particular case. Ordinarily the party suffering is a
regular subscriber to the agency, but we conceive that it would make
no difference, if the agency imparted him'the information on special
request, on any terms, or conferred it as a gift. But how if surrep-
titiously obtained through a clerk or employee, who was known to be
violating his duty in imparting it? Do the methods or means of
obtaining the information affect the question? Does the retail
merchant who submits a. statement of his business affairs for the
purpose of givitLg him a standing and credit among his business
men, run the hazard and risk of its use by any one who obtains it,
and of whom he secures credit, relying upon it, or can it be insisted
that he intended it only for the subscriber to the agency, of which he
himself was one?
Again it has been forcibly remarked, that these agencies do not
rely on what the merchant has stated as much as they do on the
general information, respecting his financial status, which they are
able to gather in the community. There is oftentimes a combination
of the statement with what the reporters of the agency have been
able to learn otherwise, so that when it reaches the foreign sub-
scriber, it is a far different thing from an -accurate transcript of what
the home merchant has said. Burchinell v. Hirsh 39 P. 352 (Co ur1
of Appeals of Colorado.)- There is a necessity therefore as the presi-
dent judge well suggests, thatthe evidence should be confined to the
actual representations made by the buyer, and it is these representa-
tions that must have been. communicated to the vendor, and as made,
must have furnished in whole or in part, an inducement to the
vendor to part with his goods on credit.
Where a statement was made by a person to obtain a rating in
the agency, though not for the purpose and with the intent that the
same should be Used to establish or obtain a credit for himself, the
court held that he could not shield himself, from the effects of a
business statement, behind a secret intention at the' time of making
the statement, that he would not profit by it. Moyer v. Lederer 50
Ill. App. 94.
An important question is: What are the obligations of the party
making the statement, in case of change of condition as respect his
financial affairs ? The question has received some consideration in
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Mofowiey v. Davis 75 Mich. 188. The majority of the court seem to
hold, that if there had been any material change in his financial
standing after the statements were made, he should have notified the
agency to whom the information was given, that persons with whom
lie commercially deals may not be misled as to the credit they may
safely extend. Some significance however is apparently given to
evidence, claimed to show an approval of the statements recently
before the sale in question. There is also a dissenting opinion, in
which it is contended that a merchant who is visited by the agents,
or attaches of a mercantile agency, and at their request gives to them
a statement of the condition of his business, is not bound thereafter
to notify such agencies of the financial or other changes in his
business; nor is he obliged to inform them if afterwards he is on the
verge of bankruttcy or unable to pay his debts. That if a merchant
should seek out an agency, for the express purpose of building up a
credit therein, the case might be different. But a merchant doing a
business without regard to these agencies as he has a right to do,
who is sought out by such agencies or their employees, and a state-
ment demanded of him, and who in good faith frankly and honestly
tells them his business condition, although under no legal obligation
to do so, is not thereby bound forever afterward to keep such
agencies informed of his financial standing, any more than lie would
be, had he made a statemenc to some person not connected with
such agencies.
Mooney v. Davis, Supra is evidently somewhat modified by a
later decision of the Michigan court, by which it would seem that a
merchant is not bound to report his changed conditions to the
agency, unless lie knows or should know, that credit is extended
upon the strength of his original rating, or unless he has or knows
that lie will become insolvent. Courtland Manufacturing Co. v. Platt
83 Mich. 419.
This particular matter is also referred to in Burchinell v. Hirsh.
Supra. In that case the jury was instructed by the trial judge, that
if after the buyers had made his statement to the commercial agency,
he found his financial condition altered, so that in some substantial
respect his statement would not be true, he was bound to publish the
fact of his insolvency; to which the learned justice, delivering the
opinion of the Court of Appeals, remarks "There is no such re-
sponsibility," but it appears that the suggestion is rather intended
to be con fined to the facts of the particular case then before the
court.
